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Abstract:
According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public
companies in 2013, Oracle’s Lawrence J. Ellison remained the best paid CEO and earned
$96.2 million as total annual compensation last year. He has received $1.8 billion over the
past 20 years. The lowest paid on the same list is General Motors’ D. F. Akerson who earned
$11.1 million. The average national pay for a non-supervisory US worker was $51,200 last year
and a CEO made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012. Hunter Harrison, Canadian
Pacific Railway Ltd., was the best paid CEO in Canada for 2012 and received $49.2-million as
total annual compensation, significantly higher than the 2011 best paid CEO, Magna’s F.
Stronach who received $40.9 million. In 2011, the average annual salary was $45,488 and
Canada’s top 50 CEOs earned 235 times more than the average Canadian. These executive
pay practices contrast with the growing inequality in Canada, recently illustrated with the
finding that 40% of Indigenous children live in poverty. In contrast, Japan’s highest paid CEO
is Nissan Motor Co.’s Carlos Ghosn who earned 988 million yen (US$10.1 million) in the year
ended March 2013, little changed from the previous year and modestly improved from his
US$ 9.5 million compensation for 2009. That does not even put him among the top 200 most
highly-paid U.S. company chiefs and the top 20 best paid CEOs in Canada for 2012. Why are
Japanese CEOs paid considerably less than their American or Canadian counterparts? This
essay argues that the activism of long-term oriented institutional investors such as banks
and the tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context of a culture of intolerance to
excessive executive compensation explain to a great extent the development of a pattern of
low executive pay in Japan despite the recent weakening of bank monitoring as a result of
the adoption of U.S. governance style in some Japanese companies. The Japanese
experience also demonstrates that lower executive compensation does not result in
compromising firm performance and is a necessary condition to build a stakeholder-friendly
corporation. For example, the CEO of Toyota (world’s biggest automaker), Akio Toyoda,
earned 184 million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012, a 35 percent increase from the previous year. He
is the lowest-paid chief of the world’s five biggest automakers and led Toyota to generate
the highest return last year among the top five global automakers. Toyota’s outlook for
increasing profit prompted the automaker to approve the biggest bonus for workers in the
last years. Alan Mulally, Ford Motor’s chief and the best paid among the top five, took home
$21 million in 2012.
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ABSTRACT
According   to   a   list   of   the   200   most   highly-paid   chief   executives   at   the   largest   U.S.   public   companies   in   2013,  
2UDFOH¶V/DZUHQFH-(OOLVRQUHPDLQHGWKHEHVWSDLG&(2DQGHDUQHGPLOOLRQDVWRWDODQQXDOFRPSHQVDWLRQ
last  year.  He  has  received  $1.8  billion  over  the  past  20  years.  The  loweVWSDLGRQWKHVDPHOLVWLV*HQHUDO0RWRUV¶'
F.  Akerson  who  earned  $11.1  million.  The  average  national  pay  for  a  non-supervisory  US  worker  was  $51,200  last  
year  and  a  CEO  made  354  times  more  than  an  average  worker  in  2012.  Hunter  Harrison,  Canadian  Pacific  Railway  
Ltd.,   was   the   best   paid   CEO   in   Canada   for   2012   and   received   $49.2-million   as   total   annual   compensation,  
VLJQLILFDQWO\ KLJKHU WKDQ WKH  EHVW SDLG &(2 0DJQD¶V ) 6WURQDFK ZKR UHFHLYHG  PLOOLRQ ,Q  WKH
average  annual  salary  was  $45,DQG&DQDGD¶VWRS&(2VHDUQHGWLPHVPRUHWKDQWKHDYHUDJH&DQDGLDQ
These  executive  pay  practices  contrast  with  the  growing  inequality  in  Canada,  recently  illustrated  with  the  finding  
that  40%  of  Indigenous  children  live  in  poverty.  In  contrast,  -DSDQ¶VKLJKHVWSDLG&(2LV1LVVDQ0RWRU&R¶VCarlos
Ghosn   who   earned   988   million   yen   (US$10.1   million)   in   the   year   ended   March   2013,   little   changed   from   the  
previous  year  and  modestly  improved  from  his  US$  9.5  million  compensation  for  2009.  That  does  not  even  put  him  
among  the  top  200  most  highly-paid  U.S.  company  chiefs  and  the  top  20  best  paid  CEOs  in  Canada  for  2012.  Why  
are  Japanese  CEOs  paid  considerably  less  than  their  American  or  Canadian  counterparts?  This  essay  argues  that  
the   activism   of   long-term   oriented   institutional   investors   such   as   banks   and   the   tying   of   executive   pay   to   worker  
welfare  in  the  context  of  a  culture  of  intolerance  to  excessive  executive  compensation  explain  to  a  great   extent  the  
development  of  a  pattern  of  low  executive  pay  in  Japan  despite  the  recent  weakening  of  bank  monitoring  as  a  result  
of  the  adoption  of  U.S.  governance  style  in  some  Japanese  companies.  The  Japanese  experience  also  demonstrates  
that  lower  executive  compensation  does  not  result  in  compromising  firm  performance  and  is  a  necessary  condition  
to   build   a   stakeholder-IULHQGO\ FRUSRUDWLRQ )RU H[DPSOH WKH &(2 RI 7R\RWD ZRUOG¶V ELJJHVW DXWRPDNHU  $NLR
Toyoda,   earned   184   million   yen   ($1.9   million)   in   2012,   a   35   percent   increase   from   the   previous   year.   He   is   the  
lowest-SDLG FKLHI RI WKH ZRUOG¶V ILYH ELJJHVW DXWRPDNHUV DQG OHG 7R\RWD WR JHQHUDWH WKH KLJKHVW UHWXUQ ODVW \HDU
DPRQJWKHWRSILYHJOREDODXWRPDNHUV7R\RWD¶VRXWORRNIRULQFUHDVLQJSURILWSURPSWHG  the  automaker  to  approve  the  
ELJJHVWERQXVIRUZRUNHUVLQWKHODVW\HDUV$ODQ0XODOO\)RUG0RWRU¶VFKLHIDQGWKHEHVWSDLGDPRQJWKHWRSILYH
took  home  $21  million  in  2012.  

INTRODUCTION  
Executive compensation has become a very pressing issue in the mid of the economic
crisis, failing corporate governance systems and growing income inequalities in rich,
LQGXVWULDOL]HGFRXQWULHV³2QHRIWKHJUHDWDV-yet-unsolved problems today is executive
1Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada). PhD (Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University), MacArthur Fellow (University of Oxford, UK), CAPORDE fellow (University of Cambridge,
UK), email: Alberto.Salazar@carleton.ca
2 Honours B.A. Graduate, York University, Toronto, Canada. Email: jraggiunti@hotmail.com
2

FRPSHQVDWLRQDQGKRZLWLVKDVFRPHWREHGHWHUPLQHG´3 Executive compensation is widely
perceived as abusive and grossly excessive and an important factor in expanding the unfair
distribution of wealth. Among the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S.
SXEOLFFRPSDQLHV2UDFOH¶V/DZUHQFH-(OOLVRQ is the best paid CEO and earned $96.2 million as
total annual compensation in 2012.4 He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 years.5 The
ORZHVWSDLGRQWKHVDPHOLVWLV*HQHUDO0RWRUV¶')$NHUVRQZKRHDUQHGPLOOLRQ$&(2
made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012.6

7KHEHVWSDLG&(2LQ&DQDGDIRUZDV&DQDGLDQ3DFLILF5DLOZD\/WG¶V&(2
Hunter Harrison, who received $49.2-million as total annual compensation, significantly higher
WKDQWKHEHVWSDLG&(20DJQD¶V)6WURQDch who received $40.9 million. In 2011, the
DYHUDJHDQQXDOVDODU\ZDVDQG&DQDGD¶VWRS&(2VHDUQHGWLPHVPRUHWKDQWKH
average Canadian worker.7 These executive pay practices contrast with the growing inequality.
Canada ranks 25th among the 30 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

3

BEBCHUK AND FRIED,THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004), 189.
Karl Russell, Executive  Pay  by  the  Numbers.  Here  are  the  200  most  highly-paid  chief  executives  at  U.S.  public  
companies  in  2013, EQUILAR, NEW YORK TIMES, June 29, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/30/business/executive-compensation-tables.html?_r=0.
5
SARAH ANDERSON, SCOTT KLINGER & SAM PIZZIGATI, EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2013: BAILED OUT,
BOOTED, AND BUSTED. A 20-<($55(9,(:2)$0(5,&$¶6723-PAID CEOS (2013).
6
Ibid.
7
CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, OVER-COMPENSATING: EXECUTIVE PAY IN
CANADA (2013), available at:
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2013/01/
Overcompensating_CEOFactsheet.pdf
2
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Development with regard to child poverty. The average child poverty rate for all children in
Canada is 17% while 40% of Indigenous children live in poverty.8

A remarkable move forward is needed in order to narrow the gap that executive
compensation creates within companies and society at large. The failures of existing corporate
JRYHUQDQFHV\VWHPVFDQEHEODPHGIRUWKHH[FHVVLYHQHVVRIH[HFXWLYHSD\³8OWLPDWHO\WKH
problems of executive compeQVDWLRQDULVHIURPDEDVLFFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHSUREOHP´9 The
inability of modern corporate governance mechanisms to control excessive executive
compensation and monitor self-interested and self-indulgent executives has become evident
around the world. The problems of executive compensation can be fully addressed by adopting
reforms that would confront corporate governance ideals with a different set of incentives,
structures and objectives.10 Some lessons can be learned from comparative studies of corporate
governance systems.

Japan has developed a pattern of low executive pay. 11 For example, the highest paid CEO
LV1LVVDQ0RWRU&R¶V&DUORV*KRVQZKRHDUQHGPLOOLRQ\HQ 86PLOOLRQ LQWKH\HDU
8

DAVID MACDONALD & DANIEL WILSON, POVERTY OR PROSPERITY. INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN
CANADA (2013), available at:
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2013/06/Poverty_or_
Prosperity_Indigenous_Children.pdf
9
BEBCHUK et al, supra note 3.
10
Ibid.
11
See e.g. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Corporate  Governance  and  Executive  Compensation:  
Evidence  from  Japan, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111 (2014); Steven N. Kaplan, Top  Executive  Rewards  and  Firm  
3

ended March 2013,12 little changed from the previous year and modestly improved from his US$
9.5 million compensation for 2009. That does not even put him among the top 200 most highlypaid U.S. company chiefs and the top 20 best paid CEOs in Canada for 2012. Japanese executive
compensation practices have thus diverged from the West and it is important to explore the
reasons for such low CEO pay pattern. This paper discusses executive compensation in Japan
from a comparative perspective and highlights some of facts and reasons that may account for
the development of the Japanese pattern of low executive pay while maintaining high levels of
efficiency and competitiveness. It argues that the activism of long-term oriented institutional
investors such as banks and the informal tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context
of a culture of intolerance to excessive executive compensation to a great extent explain the
development of a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. The Japanese experience also
demonstrates that lower executive compensation does not result in compromising firm
performance and is a necessity to build a stakeholder-friendly corporation. The paper begins with
a quick overview of the corporate governance context of executive pay in Japan and the West. It
then briefly reviews executive compensation practices in Japan, Canada and the United States
and suggests that managers can be highly competitive with lower compensations as demonstrated

Performance:  A  Comparison  of  Japan  and  the  United  States, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 510 (1994) (finding that Japanese
executives own less stock and receive lower cash compensation than U.S. executives).
12
Anna Mukai & Horie Masatsugu, Toyota  President  Delivers  Highest  Returns  For  Lowest  Pay, BLOOMBERG,
June 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/toyota-president-delivers-highest-returns-for-lowestpay.html.
4

in Japan. The last section is central and examines the corporate governance reasons that may
account for the Japanese pattern of low executive compensation.

CORPORATE   GOVERNANCE  AND   EXECUTIVE   COMPENSATION   IN   JAPAN  AND  
THE  WEST  IN  A  NUTSHELL    
Organizing and governing a corporation in capitalist societies have always been a
challenging task for business leaders, policy-makers and academics. Some practices appear to be
FRPPRQ DURXQG WKH ZRUOG DQG HQFRPSDVV ³QR OLPLWV RQ KRZ ORQJ WKH FRPSDQ\ FDQ EH LQ
business, investments occurring outside the company became the norm, and most importantly
directors/management gained increased power over operations, as well as strong support from
WKH FRXUWV´13 ,Q DGGLWLRQ D FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V OHJDO SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDQVIHUDELOLW\ RI VKDUHV GHOHJDWHG
management under a board structure, shared ownership by investors of capital, and limited
liability of owners and management are considered the common characteristics that structure the
modern corporation.14 This description of the corporation seems to be the consensus across
countries.

Yet, the divergence in corporate governance becomes quite evident once the attention is
drawn to countries with cultural differences that utilize distinctly different business practices
13

DAVID KORTEN & TEDNACE, GANGS OF AMERICA (2003), chapter 1 at 2.  
Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The  End  of  History  for  Corporate  Law, 89 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 129 (2001).
5
14

such as Japan. As known, Western nations such as Canada and the United States constitute
liberal market economies whereas Japan recognizes a more coordinated market approach. Within
a liberal market economy, all coordination problems between firms, financiers, employees and
other participants are largely handled through market incentives or free market mechanisms. 15
On the other hand, coordinated market economies rather depend heavily on non-market
relationships within formal institutions and long term objectives.16 Specifically, Japanese firms
tend to embody more of a total package organization and are committed to their long-term
sustainability.

Companies in the West often embody a short term, top down mindset which can go a
ORQJZD\LQIODZLQJIXWXUHFRPSDQ\HQGHDYRUV,QGHHG³WKHFXUUHQWV\VWHPFUHDWHVDFXOWXUHRI
how much money they can make right now and not one that looks at how decisions affect the
FRPSDQ\WHQ\HDUVGRZQWKHURDG)HZLQYHVWRUVZLWKSRZHUDQG&(2¶VLQJHQHUDOQHYHU
embrace a long-WHUPRXWORRN´17 Positions, bonuses and general operations are based on this
VKRUWWHUPSHUIRUPDQFHDQGWRSGRZQIUDPHZRUN³,QWKe United States and Canada, corporate
governance is concerned with ensuring the firm run in the interests of shareholders and that its

15

PETER HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, AN INTRODUCTION TO VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM; FROM
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
(2001) at 8.
16
Ibid at 8
17
JOHN GILLESPIE &DAVID ZWEIG, MONEY FOR NOTHING (2010) at 131.
6

REMHFWLYHLVWRFUHDWHZHDOWKIRUWKHP´18 This fundamental idea is also entrenched within the
legal framework of both countries, notably through strong fiduciary duties designed largely to
maximize shareholder value.19

Generally, three elements characterize the Japanese corporate governance model: main
bank capital markets, keiretsu cross-holdings, and insider boards of directors.20 ³7KHUROHRIEDQN
lending is crucial and the Japanese financial system is classified as bank-centered due to the
predominance of corporate borrowings from a centrally designated bank, called the main bank.
This main bank acts as the leader in monitRULQJ-DSDQHVHILUPVDQGLVDOVRWKHWRSOHQGHU´21 One
of the advantages gained from the main bank is that it may operate as a mediator towards any
outside market influences or tendencies. The keiretsu is an industrial group whose member firms
are bound by long term cross-shareholdings and maintain strong business and financial ties.22
The keiretsu system effectively eliminates the misrepresentation of management found in
Western corporations by having strong monitoring mechanisms. By pooling voting rights, the
keiretsu has control over member managers and ensures that none behave opportunistically or

18

Alan Franklin & Zhao Mengxin, The  Corporate  Governance  Model  of  Japan:  Shareholders  are  not  Rulers,
University of Pennsylvania, 1-19, 2 (2007), available at:
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~allenf/download/Vita/Japan-Corporate-Governance.pdf.
19
Ibid at2.
20
HUONG HIGGINS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: ROLE OF BANKS, KEIRETSU AND
JAPANESE TRADITIONS; FROM THE GOVERNANCE OF EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS: POST ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2004) at 96; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, Corporate  Governance,  Top  Executive  
Compensation,  and  Firm  Performance  in  Japan, 15 (1) PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL 56, 58-60 (2007).
21
HIGGINS, supra note 20, at 98.
22
HIGGINS, supra note 20, at 99; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop,  supra note 20, at 59.
7

collude operations.23 Firms that belong to the keiretsu are essentially bound together by a series
of connected contracts which maintain the crucial business relationships that are required.
Japanese boards are divided into a hierarchical structure based on promotion from within the
FRPSDQ\ZLWKYHU\OLWWOHLQIOXHQFHIURP³RXWVLGHUV´H[FHSWIRUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKHPDLQ
bank.24

It is important to note that, after the deregulation of the financial systems and corporate
JRYHUQDQFHUHIRUPVLQ-DSDQEDQNVZHUHOLPLWHGLQWKHLUXVHRI³PRFKLDL´RUFURVVshareholding25 and the Commercial Code in 2003 allowed Japanese firms to adopt a new board
system with three committees (auditing, nomination and compensation) similar to the Western
systems26 and the majority of the committee members should be outside directors27. However,
recent studies indicate that internationally exposed, more experienced and highly cross-held

23

Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra note 20, at 59.
HIGGINS, supra note 20.
25
T. Hoshi, & A. Kashyap, Will  the  U.S.  bank  recapitalization  succeed?  Eight  lessons  from  Japan. 97 JOURNAL
OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 398 (2010); Hideaki Sakawa, Keisuke Moriyama & Naoki Watanabel, Relation  
between  Top  Executive  Compensation  Structure  and  Corporate  Governance:  Evidence  from  Japanese  Public  
Disclosed  Data, 20(6) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 593, 594 (2012).
26
Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, supra note 25 , at 594-595; Toru Yoshikawa & Jean McGuire, Change  and  
Continuity  in  Japanese  Corporate  Governance, 25 ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 5, 14
(2008)(also noting that if a company chooses a committee structure, it is required to have three committees, i.e., a
nominating committee, an audit committee and a compensation committee);S.H. Goo & Fidy Xiangxing Hong, The  
Curious  Model  of  Internal  Monitoring  Mechanisms  of  Listed  Corporations  in  China:  The  Sinonisation  Process, 12
(3) EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 469, 507 (2011).
27
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice  As  Regulatory  Reform:  The  Case  of  Japanese  Corporate  
Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 353 (2005); Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at
122.
8
24

firms, with higher foreign ownership, are more likely to adopt the committee system.28 On the
other hand, firms with larger proportions of bank ownership are to some extent negatively
associated with the adoption of the committee system.29 As a result, the traditional monitoring of
firms by banks appears to be declining.30 This process of corporate governance reforms suggests
that, in terms of executive compensation decisions, Japanese corporations may be making a slow
transition from the old way of approving self-proposed executive compensation at the annual
meeting of shareholders31 to compensation committee determination.

JAPANESE  EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION  IN  COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE
Compensation levels in Canada and the United States have been on the rise since 2001, where
increases in real terms of 285% and 370% from the years ranging 1993-2001 have been
documented.32 A higher proportion of bonuses and stock options are particularly evident in
United States. Gathering information from base salaries, annual bonuses, long term incentive

28

Amon Chizema & Yoshikatsu Shinozawa, 7KHµ&RPSDQ\ZLWK  &RPPLWWHHV¶&KDQJHRU&RQWLQXLW\LQ-DSDQHVH
Corporate  Governance?, 49 (1) JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 77 (2012).
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Hideaki Sakawa & Naoki Watanabel, Executive  Compensation  and  Firm  Performance  in  Japan:  The  Role  of  
Keiretsu  Memberships  and  Bank-Appointed  Monitors, 9 (8) JOURNAL OF MODERN ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING 1119, 1120 (2013).
32
BEBCHUK et al, supra note 3.
9

plans and stock options from both a Canadian and United States perspective reveals just how
deep the gap is:
  
7DEOH7RS7HQ+LJKHVW3DLG&(2¶VLQWKH86$ -2009)33  

Company  Name                                                              CEO  Name                                                                  Total  Realized  Compensation                                                                                    
  
  
  
Blackstone Group L.P.
Oracle  Corporation
Occidental Petroleum
Hess  Corp.
Ultra  Petroleum
Chesapeake  Energy
XTO  Energy
EOG  Resources  Inc.
Nabors  Industries  Ltd.
Abercrombie  &  Fitch              

Stephen Schwarzman
Lawrence Ellison
Ray Irani
John Hess
Michael Watford
Aubrey McClendon
Bob Simpson
Mark Papa
Eugene Isenberg
Michael Jeffries

$702,440,573 million
$556,976,600 million
$222,639,705 million
$159,566,940 million
$116,929,392 million
$114,286,867 million
$103,485,972 million
$90, 471, 784 million
$79,333,079 million
$71,795,744 million

  
According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public
FRPSDQLHVLQ2UDFOH¶V/DZUHQFH-(OOLVRQUHPDLQHGWKHEHVWSDLG&(2DQGHDUQHG
million as total annual compensation last year.34 He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20

33

Andy Burt, U.S.  Top  Ten  Highest  Paid  CEOs  of  2008, BLOOMBERG, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeN1uFdDx3KA
34
Russell, supra note 4.
10

years.35 7KHORZHVWSDLGRQWKHVDPHOLVWLV*HQHUDO0RWRUV¶')$NHUVRQZKRHDUQHG
million. The top ten highest-paid CEOs on that list are as follows:
  
7DEOH7RS7HQ+LJKHVW3DLG&(2¶VLQ  the  U.S.A.  for  201236  

Company  Name                                                              CEO  Name                                                                  Total  Realized  Compensation                                                                                    
  
  

Oracle
Activision Blizzard
CBS
Discovery Communications
Level 3 Communications
HCA
Walt Disney
Nuance Communications
Yahoo
Nike

Lawrence J. Ellison
Robert A. Kotick
Leslie Moonves
David M. Zaslav
James Q. Crowe
Richard M. Bracken
Robert A. Iger
Paul A. Ricci
Marissa A. Mayer
Mark G. Parker

$96.2 million
$64.9 million
$60.3 million
$49.9 million
$40.7 million
$38.6 million
$37.1 million
$37.1 million
$36.6 million
$35.2 million

In Canada, Hunter Harrison, Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., was the best paid CEO for
2012 and received $49.2-million as total annual compensation, significantly higher than the 2011
EHVWSDLG&(20DJQD¶V)6WURQDFKZKRUHFHLYHGPLOOLRQ&(2SD\UHPDLQHGYHU\KLJK
even in 2009, the worse year of the economic recession in Canada:
  

35

Anderson, Klinger & Pizzigati,  supra note 5.
Russell, supra note 4.
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7DEOH&DQDGD¶V7RS7HQ+LJKHVW3DLG&(2¶VRI WKHZRUVW\HDURIWKH
recession)37  

Company  Name                                                                      CEO  Name                                                                                            Total    Compensation                                                                            

  
  

Barrick  Gold  Corp.                                                          Aaron  Regent                                                                                $24,217,040                                                                            
Canadian  National  Railway  Co.                  Hunter  Harrison                                                                      $17,343,160                                                                            
Onex  Corp.                                                                                    Gerald  Schwartz                                                                    $16,689,758                                                                              
Toronto  Dominion  Bank                                          Edmund  Clark                                                                            $15,188,391                                                                              
Rogers  Communications  Inc.                            Nadir  Mohamed                                                                    $13,687,699                                                                                
Gammon  Gold  Inc.                                                            Fred  George                                                                                $13,061,177                                                                              
Niko  Resources  Ltd.                                                        Edward  Sampson                                                                  $12,949,343                                                                              
Royal  Bank  of  Canada                                                  Gordon  Nixon                                                                          $12,095,885                                                                              
Shaw  Communications  Inc.                                  Jim  Shaw                                                                                          $11,557,119                                                                                
Yamana  Gold  Inc.                                                                Peter  Marrone                                                                          $11,534,588              

7DEOH&DQDGD¶V7RS7HQ+LJKHVW3DLG&(2¶VRI38

Company  Name                                                                      CEO  Name                                                                Total  Compensation                                                                                  

Magna

Frank Stronach
(Ex-Chair/Ex-CEO)
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int. Michael Pearson
Pretium Resources Inc.
Robert A. Quartermain
Shaw Communications Inc. Bradley Shaw
Dundee Corp.
Ned Goodman
37

40,984,820
36,308,716
16,908,729
15,851,336
15,037,835

HUGH MACKENZIE, RECESSION-3522)&$1$'$¶6%(673$,'&(26 (2011), available at:
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2011/01/Recession%20
Proof.pdf
38
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, supra note 7.
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Suncor Energy Inc.
Magna International Inc.
Onex Corp.
Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
Yamana Gold Inc

Rick George
Donald Walker
Gerald Schwartz
Robert Friedland
Peter Marrone

14,857,818
14,836,948
14,133,703
12,574,305
12,416,999
  

7DEOH&DQDGD¶V7RS7HQ+LJKHVW3DLG&(2¶VRI39

Company  Name                                                                      CEO  Name                                                                Total  Compensation                                                                                  

Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd.
Thomson Reuters Corp.
Talisman Energy Inc.
Eldorado Gold Corp.
Magna International Inc.
Open Text Corp.
Royal Bank of Canada
Onex Corp.
Catamaran Corp.
Yamana Gold Inc.

Hunter Harrison
James Smith
John Manzoni
Paul Wright
Donald Walker
Mark Barrenechea
Gordon Nixon
Gerald Schwartz
Mark Thierer
Peter Marrone

$49.2-million
$18.8-million
$18.7-million
$18.7-million
$16.9-million
$14.8-million
$13.7-million
$13.3-million
$12.9-million
$12.1-million

This quick data shows that excessiveness have been dominating executive compensation
practices in the United States and Canada even during one of the worst economic recessions. It
also raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of disclosure and monitoring mechanisms
designed to control excessive compensation in the West. Even with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) having precise requirements on the mandatory disclosure of the highest paid
39

How  Much  Canada's  Top  100  Ceos  Got  Paid  Last  Year, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May. 27 2013, updated Jul.
23 2013),http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/management/executivecompensation/executive-compensation/article12136604/?from=12145005
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corporate officers and their corporate holdings, efforts have still fallen short in facilitating any
change to how complex compensation packages are rendered.40 Additionally, a number of public
web based disclosure sites have been initiated in Canada (sedar.com) and the United States
(edgar.com) which contain all mandatory annual reports which present company, director and
management based financial information. Without question the bulk of the disparity regarding
CEO compensation rests within the United States. Canadian executive pay is also quite
unwarranted and creates a rather ominous situation. The economy overall is not constructed to
work at its ideal level when enormous compensation packages are handed out to a fraction of
LQGLYLGXDOVZLWKLQWKHSRSXODWLRQ&KDQJHLVFHUWDLQO\QHHGHGDQGLW³ZRXOGEHZLVHWRFRQVLGHU
WKH FRPSHWLWLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDO HQYLURQPHQW LQ ZKLFK ZH FRPSHWH IRU FRUSRUDWH SDWURQDJH´41
³3HUKDSV RQHFRXld accept the high pay levels of the United States and Canadian executives if
RQHFRXOGREVHUYHWKHVDPHKLJKSD\OHYHOVLQRWKHUPDMRULQGXVWULDOL]HGFRXQWULHV´42
However, Japan has developed a pattern of low executive pay and has then made the
excessiveness of executive pay and the wage disparities of the West more evident. The following
data shows that Japan has maintained lower compensation levels over the last 20 years:
Table  6:  International  Comparison  of  CEO  Pay43  

40

Benjamin Alarie, Executive  Compensation  and  Tax  Policy:  Lessons  for  Canada  from  the  Experience  of  the  United  
6WDWHVLQWKH¶V, 61 (1) UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW REVIEW39 (2003).
41
Ibid. at71.
42
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS(1991), at 204.
43
Dr. Mark Kroll, CEO  Pay  Rates:  US  versus  Foreign  Nations, 510 MANAGEMENT 1 (2005).
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Country                                  Average  CEO  Pay  (1988)        Average  CEO  Pay  (2003)      Foreign  CEO  Pay  Relative  to  U.S.    

  
  
Japan
(65% Taxed Income)

$437,655

$456,937
(-4% Change)

20%

Canada

$398,946

$889,898
(123% Change)

45%

United States

$759,043

$2,249,080
(196% Change)

100%

  
7DEOH-DSDQ¶V7RS+LJKHVW3DLG([HFXWLYHVLQ WRSRQO\GLVSOD\HG 44  

Executive                                                Company                                                                Total  (millions-Yen)                Total  ($US)                                                                            
  
  
Carlos Ghosn
Howard Stringer
Yoshitoshi Kitajima
Banjiro Uemura
Alan MacKenzie
Chihiro Kanagawa
Reiji Hosoya
Hiroshi Mitsuhara
Hajime Satomi
Shigetaka Komori

Nissan  Motor  Co.
Sony  Corp.
Dai  Nippon  Printing  Co.
Tohokushinsha  Film  Corp.
Takeda  Pharmaceutical  Co.
Shin-Etsu  Chemical  Co.
Futaba  Corp.
Nihon  Chouzai  Co.
Sega  Sammy  Holdings  Inc.
Fujifilm  Holdings  Corp.

891
815
787
675
553
535
517
477
435
361

$9.5 (million)
$8.7 (million)
$8.4 (million)
$7.2 (million)
$5.9 (million)
$5.7(million)
$5.5 (million)
$5.1(million)
$4.6 (million)
$3.8 (million)

("Total" figure includes salary, bonus, options, retirement, and other benefits)

44

Taku Kato & Minh Bui, *KRVQ6WULQJHU.DWDMLPDDUH-DSDQ¶V0RVW3DLG([HFXWLYHV7RS7DEOH,
BLOOMBERG, July 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-02/ghosn-stringer-katajima-are-japan-smost-paid-executives-top-50-table.html.
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Note.- We have converted Japanese yens to US dollars based on the rate of 93.5 yens per 1 US dollar for
2009 following W. Antweiler.45

Recent data further confirms such a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. Nissan Motor
&R¶V Carlos Ghosn UHPDLQV -DSDQ¶V KLJKHVW SDLG &(2 DQG UHSRUWHGO\ HDUQHG  PLOOLRQ \HQ
(US$10.1 million) in the year ended March 2013.46 His compensation little changed from the
previous year and modestly improved from his US$9.8 million compensation in 201047 and US$
PLOOLRQFRPSHQVDWLRQIRU\HDUVLQZKLFKKHZDV-DSDQ¶VWRSHDUQHU,WLVLPSRUWDQWWR
note that the median executive among Japan's 269 most highly paid managers earned
approximately $1.48 million in total compensation for 2010 whereas the median manager's total
compensation was approximately $16.7 million among the 269 most highly paid executives in
the United States in 2010.48 *KRVQ¶VPLOOLRQFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUGRHVQRWHYHQSXWKLP
among the top 200 most highly-paid U.S. company chiefs for 201349 and the top 20 best paid
&(2VLQ&DQDGDIRU,QWKHDXWRPRELOHLQGXVWU\7R\RWD¶V&(2 Akio Toyoda, reportedly
earned 184 million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012 and is the lowest-SDLG FKLHI RI WKH ZRUOG¶V ILYH
biggest automakers.50 )RUG 0RWRU¶V &(2$ODQ 0XODOO\ LV UHSRUWHGO\ WKH EHVW SDLG DPRQJ WKH

45

Werner Antweiler, Foreign  Currency  Units  per  1  U.S.  Dollar,  1948-2011. PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service,
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (2012), available at: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf.
46
Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 11.
47
Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 134.
48
Ibid.
49
Russell, supra note 4.
50
Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 11.
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top five, taking home $21 million in 201251 whereas *HQHUDO0RWRUV¶')$NHUVRQHDUQHG11.1
million in 2012.52 7R\RWD¶V&(2OHGKLVFRPSDQ\WRJHQHUDWHWKHKLJKHVWUHWXUQDPRQJWKHWRS
five automakers,53 yet he earned less than one-WHQWKDVPXFKDV)RUG¶V&(2DQGOHVVWKDQWZRtenth of General Motors¶&(2SD\
Part of the explanation for lower compensation levels in Japan vis-a-vis United States
and Canada lies in the use of, or the lack thereof, stock options. These stock option components
within compensation packages have without question become the single most important element
of any Western executive pay plan. Stock options represent over 140% of the base salary in the
United States and Canada while Japan sits at a stingy 13%.54 More recent studies indicate that
the base salary often represents about 70 percent of Japanese executive compensation packages
and the incentive plans, excluding cash bonuses, account for only 17 percent.55 This is consistent
with the fact that share ownership by top executives has not been a prominent feature of
executive compensation or traditional corporate governance mechanisms in Japan.56 Stock
options are a relatively new component introduced into the Japanese corporate world and until
51

Ibid.
Russell, supra note 4.
53
Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 11.
54
Gregory Jackson, THE ORIGINS OF NON-LIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN
COMPARISON (2001) atpp. 121- ³7KH2ULJLQVRI1RQ-Liberal Corporate Governance in Germany and
-DSDQ´ 
55
WATSON WYATT WORLD, EXECUTIVE PAY PRACTICE AROUND THE WORLD (2009); Robert J.
Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 114 (finding that the structure of executive pay in Japan relies
heavily on payments unrelated to performance such as salary).
56
N. Abe, N. Gaston & K. Kubo, Executive  pay  in  Japan:  The  role  of  bank-appointed  monitors  and  the  main  bank  
relationship, 17 (3) JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 371, 386 (2005); Steven N. Kaplan, supra note 11.
(finding that Japanese executives own less stock and receive lower cash compensation than U.S. executives)
17
52

recently they did not make much use of them.57 Only after the 1997 amendment to the Japanese
Commercial Code, it became legally possible to grant stock options.58 Moreover, disclosure
levels had not been seen as necessary due to the lower compensation levels of top Japanese
management. Only recently, on  March  31,  2010  the  Cabinet  Office  Ordinance  on  Disclosure  of  
Corporate  Affairs,  etc.  was  amended  to  require  companies  to  disclose  the  total  amount  of  
directors'  remuneration,  total  amount  by  category  and  total  amount  of  remuneration  of  officers  
whose  remuneration  exceeds  100  million  yen59  (approximately  $1  million).60  . However, only
152 Japanese public companies disclosed that their 269 executives earned more than 100 million
yen in 2009.61
.

The disparities between executive pay and worker wages further show the extent to
which Japan has divergHGIURPWKH:HVWHUQSDWWHUQVRIH[FHVVLYHH[HFXWLYHFRPSHQVDWLRQ³&(2
pay was 7.8 times higher in Japan than the average worker, and 25.8 times in the United States in
1991, and this figure rose 11 times higher in Japan and an astounding 35 times larger in the
57

Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra note 20, at 60; Masayuki Morikawa,infra note 68.
Abe, Gaston & Kubo, supra note 52, at 381; Masao Nakamura & Syen T. Rebien, Corporate  social  responsibility  
and  corporate  governance:  Japanese  firms  and  selective  adaptation, 45 UBC Law Review 723, 758-59 (2012).
59
Tokyo Stock Exch., Inc., TSE-Listed   Companies   White   Paper   on   Corporate   Governance, 69 (February, 2013)
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf.
60
In   Japan,   Underpaid-and   Loving   It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 2011 (indicating $1.1 million)
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186014341924.htm; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Japan's  
Executives   to   Reveal   Compensation   Under   New   Rules, Wall St. J., June 9, 2010,
,http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703890904575296390830444072; Robert J. Jackson, Jr. &
Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 127.
61
Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 131-132;;  In  Japan,  Underpaid-and  Loving  It,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 2011 (noting that fewer than 300 executives at Japan's 3,813 public companies
earned enough in 2009 to require disclosure),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186014341924.htm
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8QLWHG6WDWHV´62 The CEO-worker pay disparity continued to worsen in the United States in the
following years, reaching alarming proportions particularly when compared to the Japanese ratio:
Table  8:  Ratio  of  CEO  Pay  to  the  Average  Worker63    
                                                                Country                                                                                                                            Total  Ratio  
  
Japan
Canada
United States

11:1
20:1
475:1

  
Recent studies have confirmed that CEO-worker pay ratio in the United States and
Canada remains extremely high. The pay gap between large company chief executives and
average American workers has grown from 195-to-1 in 1993 to 354-to-1 in 2012.64 The average
national pay for a non-supervisory US worker was reportedly $51,200 in 2012.65 Needless to say,
these large pay disparities harm employee morale and productivity. The 2010 Dodd-Frank
legislation requiring CEO-worker pay ratio disclosure was enacted to correct such huge disparity
and executive excessiveness, but it has not yet been implemented after three years 66 and has

62

Jackson, supra  note 52, at 292.
Kroll, supra note 41.
64
Anderson, Klinger & Pizzigati, supra note 5, at 4.
65
Mark Gongloff, CEOs  Paid  273  Times  More  Than  Workers  in  2012:  Study, THE HUFFINGTON POST, June 26,
2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/ceos-paid-times-more-than-workers_n_3504821.html
66
Anderson, Klinger & Pizzigati, supra note 5, at 21.
19
63

faced strong opposition from American corporations.67 In Canada, the average annual salary was
LQDQG&DQDGD¶VWRS&(2VHDUQHGWLPHVPRUHWKDQWKHDYHUDJHZRUNHU68

Interestingly, Japanese corporations have become some of the most competitive and
efficient companies in the world while developing a pattern of low executive pay, low CEOworker pay ratio and heavy income taxes. This presents important challenges to Western beliefs
RI WKH QHHG WR FRUUHODWH KLJK H[HFXWLYH SD\ VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH DQG ILUP FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV ³7KH
Japanese regularly lecture the West on their short-sighted behavior. They ask how they will ever
become competitive unless you are willing to make long-term investments ±investments that
PD\SURGXFHRQO\ORVVHVIRU\HDUVEHIRUHWKH\EHJLQWRSD\RII´ 69 In particular, Canada and the
United States may want to learn that even with lower salaries, higher tax levels, and greater
monitoring/disclosure mandates, corporate lifestyle and business operations do not have to
suffer. A critical factor in maintaining firm competitiveness with a pattern of low executive pay
has been the uniqueness of the Japanese corporate governance system that provides effective
monitoring and disclosure and aids in reducing high risk investments/business ventures. The
following section further discusses the importance of this Japanese corporate governance system
for controlling executive compensation.
67

6DUDK$QGHUVRQ,QWHUYLHZDVUHSRUWHGLQ³RIWRS-paid CEOs busted, bailed out or booted, study says. CEOs
of U.S. large companies got about 354 times as much pay as the average American worker in 2012, CBC News, Aug
30, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2013/08/30/business-executive-excess.html
68
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, supra note 7.
69
Crystal, supra note 40, at 205-206.
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EXPLAINING  THE  PATTERN  OF  LOW  EXECUTIVE  PAY  IN  JAPAN
The above review of the patterns of executive pay in Japan, Canada and the US once
again confirms that excessive executive compensation is not a universal norm and has little to do
with efficiency. Furthermore, the Japanese experience sheds light on the factors that may account
for the development of low executive pay patterns. While the Japanese corporate governance
system can be credited for the development of lower executive compensation practices, the
Japanese business culture steers the governance of corporations towards a practice that is
unfriendly to excessive executive pay. A business culture that does not tolerate excessiveness
neither encourage greed is likely to both favor lower executive compensation practices and
harness the corporate governance system to control executive excessiveness.

The Japanese practice of paying lower compensations to executives appears to be
consistent with a long-standing tradition of discouraging greed and shareholder value
maximization as the dominant principles of running a company. Contemporary Japanese firms
continue to share long-standing attitudes against greed and shareholder primacy in order to
maintain social harmony and are often concerned about the long-term sustainability of the firm.70
70

Nakamura & Rebien, supra note 58, at 729. See also Michael E. Porter, Capital  Disadvantage:  America's  Failing  
Capital  Investment  System,  HARv. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 70 (claiming that Japanese owners look to the
long-term); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
443 (1992) (noting that -DSDQHVHILUPV³DUHQRWUXQLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHLUVKDUHKROGHUV´ 
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Executives have customarily avoided standing out as highly compensated individuals.71 A recent
study has, for example, found some evidence that executive compensation at Japanese firms with
traditional statutory-auditor structures seems to be subject to an upper limit that executives
carefully observe with the consequence of not receiving increases that would exceed the limit.72
Moreover, this constraint on excessive executive compensation appears to be common to all
Japanese managers regardless of whether they lead a firm with the traditional auditor system or
the new committee system.73 Similarly, significant portion of executive compensation packages
has traditionally been in the form of perquisites as opposed to salary, which has to some extent
changed with the recent introduction of stock options in Japan.74 Even after stock options were
legally allowed in 1997, the number of firms that adopted stock options increased until the mid2000s and since then has remained the same or decreased slightly.75 According to a Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry survey of approximately 30,000 large and medium-sized Japanese
firms, only 1,505 firms or 5.4% of the total firms surveyed adopted stock options in 2009.76 As

71

Nakamura & Rebien, supra note 58, at 729
Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 146.
73
Ibid. at 156.
74
Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi, Michael Lemmon, Mi Luo & James Schallheim, An  Empirical  Examination  of  the  Costs  
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for TSE-listed companies, only 31.1.% (down 0.4%) of listed companies have introduced stock  
option  plans  as  of  February  2013  while  expressing    hesitation  and  resistance.77

This unfriendly attitude to corporate greed and ensuing lower compensation practices
KDYHQRWUHVXOWHGLQFRPSURPLVLQJILUPSHUIRUPDQFH)RUH[DPSOH7R\RWD¶V&(2$NLR
Toyoda, reportedly earned 184 million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012, a 35 percent increase from the
previous year. He is the lowest-SDLGFKLHIRIWKHZRUOG¶VILYHELJJHVWDXWRPDNHUVZKHUHDV$ODQ
0XODOO\)RUG¶VFKLHILVWKHEHVWSDLGDPRQJWKHWRSILYHDQGWRRNKRPHPLOOLRQLQ
Akio Toyoda led Toyota to generate the highest return last year among the top five global
automakers.78 7R\RWDKDVUHWDNHQWKHWLWOHRIZRUOG¶VELJJHVWDXWRPDNHUIURP*HQHUDO0RWRUV
last year.79 0RUHRYHULWLVQRWXQFRPPRQWKDW-DSDQHVH&(2¶VZLOOUHWXUQDSRUWLRQRIWKHLU
compensations when their companies perform poorly. For instance, in 2010, Toyoda rejected his
bonus pay after a recall of more than 8 million cars worldwide, making his annual compensation
WKHORZHVWDPRQJ-DSDQ¶VWKUHHODUJHVWDXWRPDNHUVIRUWKDW\HDU80 Sony CEO Kazuo Hirai along
with approximately 40 Sony senior executives voluntarily forwent annual bonuses for 2012 as
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURILWFRQWLQXHGWRVXIIHU81 More recently, many Japanese listed companies have
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indicated that they  would  cut  officer  compensation  in  the  event  of  deteriorating  business  
performance.82  This contrasts with Western practices of paying excessive compensation even
ZKHQWKHFRPSDQ\SHUIRUPVSRRUO\)RUH[DPSOH2UDFOH¶V/DUU\(OOLVRQLVWKHKLJKHVWpaid CEO in the United States and received $96.2 million, a 24 percent increase despite his
FRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHIHOOE\SHUFHQW83 This weak link between pay and performance has been
recently proven with the finding that, in the past 20 years, nearly 40 per cent of the highest-paid
CEOs in the U.S. have been bailed out, fired or arrested for illegal activities.84

Such Japanese business culture has encouraged a clear responsibility of the corporation to
its stakeholders.85 The prevalence of such strong stakeholder culture in Japan has also worked
against the development of excessive executive compensation practices. The belief that, a
company should not be run solely to protect the interest of shareholders or executives and the
interests of multiple participants that have a stake and contribute to the sustainability of the
company are also important,86 KDVRIWHQLQIOXHQFHGH[HFXWLYHSD\GHFLVLRQV³-DSDQDFWLYHO\
HQVXUHVWKDWILUPVDUHUXQLQVXFKDZD\WKDWVRFLHW\¶VUHVRXUFHVDUHXVHGHIILFLHQWO\E\WDNLQJ
into account a range of stakeholders, in addition to shareholders, while not having a fiduciary
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UHVSRQVLELOLW\´87 Such stakeholder culture influences the role and expectations of CEOs. The
-DSDQHVHFRPSDQ\7R\RWDLOOXVWUDWHVWKHSXUVXLWRIVWDNHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWVZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJKLJK
levels of competitiveness. On August 1, 2001 the Financial Times reported details of the annual
meeting of the International Corporate Governance Network which was held in Tokyo that year:
Hiroshi  Okuda,  chairman  of  Toyota  Motor  Corporation  and  of  the  Japan  Federation  of  
Employers'   Associations   told   the   assembled   money   managers   that   it   would   be  
irresponsible  to   run  Japanese  companies  primarily  in   the  interests  of   shareholders.  His  
manner  of  doing  so  left  no  doubt  about  the  remaining  depth  of  Japanese  exceptionalism  
in   corporate   governaQFH«0U 2NXGD PDGH KLV SRLQW E\ WHOOLQJ JXHVWV ZKDW -DSDQHVH
junior   high   school   textbooks   say   about   corporate   social   responsibility.   Under   Japanese  
company   law,   they   explain,   shareholders   are   the   owners   of   the   corporation.   But   if  
corporations   are   run   exclusively   in   the   interests   of   shareholders,   the   business   will   be  
driven   to   pursue   short   -term   profit   at   the   expense   of   employment   and   spending   on  
research   and   development.   To   be   sustainable,   children   are   told,   corporations   must  
nurture   relationships   with   stakeholders   such   as   suppliers,   employees   and   the   local  
community.   So   whatever   the   legal   position,   the   textbooks   declare,   the   corporation   does  
not  belong  to  its  owners.88  

(PEHGGHG LQ D FXOWXUH WKDW LV RIWHQ XQIULHQGO\ WR JUHHG DQG IULHQGO\ WR VWDNHKROGHUV¶
interest, institutional investors, with a long-term stake and therefore interested in the long-tem
sustainability of corporations, have been a driving force in maintaining lower compensation
levels in Japan. Specifically, Japanese banks have played a critical role in controlling excessive
compensation, particularly in keiretsu firms. The main bank is usually the top lender to, and one
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of the largest shareholders of, the firm.89 In such a position, banks have been able to monitor
management via shareholder ownership and bank-appointed directors.90 Banks have been
HIIHFWLYH LQ OLPLWLQJ WKH DELOLW\ RI &(2¶V WR FRQWURO FRUSRUDWLRQV DQG WKHLU PRQLWRULQJ UROH KDV
helped keep executive compensation at lower levels.91 ,QSDUWLFXODU³CEOs of keiretsu firms are
more subject to major shareholder monitoring and less able to use their power to increase their
RZQFRPSHQVDWLRQ´92 Some studies have found that executive compensation is lower in keiretsu
firms than in non-keiretsu firms.93 Such shareholder monitoring is associated with the leading
role of the main bank that has great control over the keiretsu member firms94 and helps reduce
managerial opportunism.95
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However, after the deregulation of the financial system and corporate governance reforms
in Japan and in the face of the pressures from global capital markets, Japanese banks appear to be
gradually withdrawing from their traditional monitoring of firms. 96 The adoption of committee
systems and the increase of foreign ownership over the last decade are likely to affect the
traditional bank-centered corporate governance systems with their higher bank ownership and
bank-appointed directors.97 These changes may diminish the power of banks to control
potentially excessive executive compensation in the future.98 For instance, according to the 2003
reforms of the Commercial Code, firms were allowed to adopt the committee systems, including
a compensation committee which is expected to design individual executive compensation and
be composed mostly of outside directors.99 Similarly, the increasing presence of foreign
shareholders puts pressure on existing executive compensation practices and may eventually
result in spreading practices such as the wide use of stock options100 that may bring executive
compensation closer to the excessiveness of Anglo-American standards.
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In fact, preliminary evidence indicates that Japanese firms that have adopted U.S. board
structures including committees have also adopted similar U.S. pay practices 101 suggesting the
development of higher executive compensation practices. Highest-paid executives at committeebased firms receive some forty percent of their compensation in performance-sensitive payments
such as bonuses and stock options whereas executives at firms with traditional governance
structures receive less than twenty percent of their compensation in bonuses and stocks.102 NonJapanese executives earn about forty percent more than Japanese executives and receive fifty
percent more of their compensation in the form of stock options in comparison to their Japanese
counterparts.103 While this represents a recent change to the traditional pattern of low executive
pay in some Japanese companies, it should be noted that only 112 public Japanese companies
adopted the committee system as of April 2009,104 just 7% of the 152 firms that were required to
disclose individual executive compensation in 2010 adopted committees105 and only 2.2% of all  
TSE-Listed  Companies   are companies with committees as of February 2013.
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number of Japanese firms that have adopted stock options remains low107 and the structure of
executive pay still relies very heavily on payments unrelated to performance notably salary. 108 It
thus remains to be seen whether the Japanese pattern of low executive pay will resist and survive
the new pressures.
In such a context in which banks, as lenders and major shareholders, have been active in
controlling executive compensation, it should not be surprising to find competent boards that are
also active in monitoring executives and are intolerant to excessive executive pay.Japanese
boards are better able to think strategically and often provide a strong oversight while bringing a
wide range of relevant experiences to the boardroom.109 Taft and Gangaram maintain that
³-DSDQHVHERDUGVRIGLUHFWRUVSUide themselves on the long-term solvency of the corporation and
WKH VROLGLILFDWLRQ RI FRQVLVWHQW FRPSHWLWLRQ OHYHOV´ DQG ³VWUHVV WKH LQWULQVLF UHZDUGV D &(2
UHFHLYHV IURP VWHHULQJ WKH VKLS LQ WKH DSSURSULDWH GLUHFWLRQ´110 Yet, unlike their American
counterpDUWV-DSDQHVHERDUGVRIGLUHFWRUVKDYHQRWVXFFXPEHGWRWKHQRWLRQWKDW&(2¶VQHHGDQ
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excessive compensation to be effective or efficient.111 Wealth concentration in the form of both
increasing short-term shareholder returns and huge bonus for directors does not seem to be an
imperative in the eyes of Japanese boards. In particular, Japanese boards that are smaller and
have outside directors tend to pay lower compensations to their executives.112 Bank-appointed
directors are active monitors of executives and executive compensation is both smaller and less
sensitive to performance in firms with a main bank relationship or bank-appointed directors.113

Consistent with a strong stakeholder culture, the interests of workers are given significant
consideration and thus inform the decisions about the compensation of corporate executives.  The
perception of corporate management as a group effort further encourages the need to relate CEO
FRPSHQVDWLRQWRHPSOR\HHV¶VDODULHV114This is indicative of the central place that employee
welfare has in Japanese firms.115 ,QGHHG³-DSDQKDVPDGHDFRQVFLRXVGHFLVLRQWRWU\WRSURWHFW
LWVZRUNHUVIURPXQHPSOR\PHQWHYHQDWWKHH[SHQVHRIILQDQFLDOJDLQ´116 Japanese corporations
are known for their commitment to lifetime employment,117 although this has not been applied
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equally to male and female workers and the gender wage gap remains high.118 Nevertheless, the
VWURQJSURWHFWLRQRIZRUNHUV¶LQWHUHVWLVSDUWRIWKHODUJHUFRPPLWPHQWWRSURPRWHLQGXVWULDO
citizenship of labor in addition to the financial commitment of capital.119

,WVKRXOGQRWFRPHDVDVXUSULVHWKHQWKDWHPSOR\HHV¶ZDJHVDUHRIWHQWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW
when setting executive pay. Some studies have indicated that changes in Japanese executive base
pay are linked to general movements in employee wages and salaries.120 According to a survey
by the Employment System Research Center, approximately 70% of the surveyed firms indicated
WKDWWKH\DGMXVWDQQXDOH[HFXWLYHVDODULHVEDVHGRQDQLQFUHDVHRIHPSOR\HHV¶VDODU\LQDGGLWLRQ
to firm performance and industry standards.121 In recent years, there has been significant public
pressure to further narrow the gap between the salaries of top managers and average employees.
Critics have suggested that the large cash reserves of many public companies should be used to
pay higher salaries to workers.122 Similarly, stock options, albeit recent and modestly used, have
been granted not only to executives but also to employees. A Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry survey of approximately 30,000 large and medium-sized Japanese firms indicates that
70% or more of the total firms that have adopted stock options granted stock options to both
118
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executives and employees during the 1998-2005 period.123 As of February 2013, a high number
of statutory auditor and committee-based TSE-listed companies with stock option plans offer
these plans mostly to employees and inside directors.124 Bonuses are also given to executives and
HPSOR\HHV7R\RWDSURYLGHVDYHU\UHFHQWH[DPSOH7R\RWD¶V&(2$NLR7R\RGDHDUQHG
million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012, a 35 percent increase from the previous year. He is the
lowest-SDLGFKLHIRIWKHZRUOG¶VILYHELJJHVWDXWRPDNHUVDQG7R\RWD¶VRXWORRNIRULQFUHDVLQJ
profit has prompted the automaker to approve the biggest bonus for workers since 2008.125

It would also be expected that executive bonuses will be lowered when employee
bonuses are reduced in order to save labour cost and avoid massive lay-offs in tough economic
times.126 The possibility of a promotion tournament that uses executive compensation also as a
reward for a successful career after a series of employee competitions within Japanese
corporations further reinforces the need to link executive pay to the wages of workers at lower
levels.127 These corporate practices may reflect the strong commitment to social equality in
Japan, which is an important cultural constraint both to control potential excessiveness in
executive compensation and reduce the gap between the compensation of executives and

123

Morikawa, supra note 66, at 2.
Tokyo Stock Exch., Inc., TSE-Listed  Companies  White  Paper  on  Corporate  Governance, 67 (February, 2013),
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf
125
Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 11.
126
Abe, Gaston & Kubo, supra note 52, at 379.
127
Ibid. at 388-389.
32
124

employees.128 In sum, this Japanese practice of tying executive pay to the salary of workers helps
keep executive compensation lower while considerably narrowing the pay gap between CEOs
and average Japanese workers down to some of the smallest in the world and distributing
corporate gains more equally.
,QFRQWUDVW&(2¶VLQWKH:HVWKDYHJDLQHGVLJQLILFDQWSRZHULQFRUSRUDWHGHFLVLRQVDQG
HDUQH[FHVVLYHFRPSHQVDWLRQVRIWHQUHJDUGOHVVRIZRUNHUV¶ZDJHVORVVHVDQGXQFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV³7KH&(2KDVQRERVV:HSUHWHQGWKDWWKH&(2KDVDERVV:HSUHWHnd that it
is the board of directors. But it almost never is. Basically, the board of directors of most
RUJDQL]DWLRQVMXVWOLNHDOORWKHUVXERUGLQDWHVVHHWKHPVHOYHVDVHPSOR\HHVRIWKH&(2´129 Most
&(2¶VGLFWDWHDQGZRUNWRLPSOHPHQWWKHLURZQERDUGVDJendas, compensation packages and
LQIRUPDWLRQIORZV³7KXVPDQ\ERDUGVHYHQWKRXJKWKHLUSULPDU\FRPPLWPHQWLVWR
VKDUHKROGHUVFRPHWRUHSUHVHQWH[HFXWLYHLQWHUHVWVLQVWHDG´130 Corporate board oversight has
EHFRPHODUJHO\DQLOOXVLRQ³7KHUHLVDFRQWLQXHG dysfunction of too many boards: selecting
inadequate CEOs in the first place; failing to advise and mentor executives and avoiding realistic
VXFFHVVIXOSODQQLQJ´131 As a result, excessive executive compensation and short-term profit
maximization dominate corporate decisions to the detriment of the long-term sustainability of
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companies and the well-being of employees. Countrywide Financials and the compensation paid
to its CEO Angelo Mozilo is one of the most obvious examples of that problem:
Mr. Mozilo ran roughshod over his board, while receiving more than $200 million in
salary and bonuses in 2007, while Countrywide, the very same year announced a $1.2
billion dollar loss in the third quarter and a $422 million loss in the fourth quarter. As the
FRPSDQ\¶Vstock dropped 80% during this time, Mr. Mozilo was paid $2 million and
received an additional $20 million in stock options while selling off $122 million
more.132
  
CONCLUSION  
  
This paper has discussed the pattern of low executive compensation in Japan. It was
argued that the activism of long-term oriented institutional investors such as banks and the
informal tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context of a culture of intolerance to
excessive executive compensation have been critical in the development of a pattern of low
executive pay in Japan. The Japanese experience also reveals that lower executive compensation
does not result in compromising firm performance and is a necessary condition to build a
stakeholder-friendly corporation. These findings suggest some lessons for regulating excessive
H[HFXWLYH FRPSHQVDWLRQ LQ PRGHUQ FRUSRUDWLRQV DURXQG WKH ZRUOG -DSDQ¶V H[HFXWLYH
compensation practices indicate that the presence of more effective internal controls may help in
controlling excessiveness in executive pay. In particular, the active role of institutional
132
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shareholders with a long-term orientation and the adoption of a tougher board oversight in the
context of a culture that is unfriendly to greed and friendly to stakeholders would be ideal, but
this requires fundamental changes to existing corporate beliefs in the West. Furthermore, the
W\LQJ RI HPSOR\HHV¶ LQWHUHVW WR H[HFXWLYH SD\ LV HIIHFWLYH LQ ORZHULQJ H[HFXWLYH FRPSHQVDWLRQ
and some form of employee participation in the governance of corporations should also be given
serious consideration as it may help monitor the implementation of such tying while fostering a
stakeholder culture.

Further research is needed in several respects. This work is based on a review of the
literature on the determinants of executive compensation in Japan and more empirical
investigations would be ideal to expand some of the findings associated with the pattern of low
executive compensation. It is also important to explore in a more in-depth manner both the
influence of the Japanese business culture on the development of executive compensation
practices and the extent to which the pressures from the globalization of the capital market can
transform such practices in the near future.
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